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matters. I agree to the trip to MOSCOW of
XIAO, JINGUANG and the other comrades.
FILIPPOV [Stalin]
29.10.50.
Copies: Stalin, Bulganin
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 334,
List 64]
34. 1 November 1950, ciphered telegram,
Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Shtykov
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 5222
TO SHTYKOV
You request that our officers and advi-
sers remain in the disposition of the [North]
Koreans for the formation of Korean divi-
sions. Such a point of view of yours is well
known to us. But we do not know the points
of view of the [North] Korean government,
we do not know whether it wishes to have
Soviet officers and advisers in the future or
prefers to invite Chinese. You still have not
communicated the point of view of the Ko-
rean government on this subject. We cannot
impose our advisers and officers on the Ko-
rean government. Let KIM IL SUNG com-
municate his point of view regarding this.
FYN SI [STALIN]
1 November 1950
Copies: Stalin (2), 8th Department of the
General Staff to Shtykov
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347,
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 47
General Assembly at an appropriate mo-
ment, according to your discretion.
We are simultaneously giving an order
to the Soviet representative in the DVK [Far
Eastern Commission] to make a correspond-
ing statement on this question and to support
the protest of the government of the DPRK
against the use by the United States of Japa-
nese in military operations in Korea.
By order of Instantsiia [i.e., Stalin].
A. GROMYKO
To p.332(op) pr.PB No. 78
TOP SECRET
Attachment 2
WASHINGTON
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
It is necessary for you the make the
following statement at the next meeting of
the Far Eastern Commission:
“As is known, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Korean People’s Democratic
Republic, Pak Hon-Yong, has sent to the
chairman of the General Assembly and to
the chairman of the Security Council a pro-
test against the use of Japanese servicemen
in military actions in Korea. In this protest
it is shown that in the fundamental facts
found in the decree of the government of the
Korean People’s Democratic Republic, it is
established that Japanese servicemen par-
ticipated in battles in the area of Seoul to-
gether with American troops, that one Japa-
nese company participated in battles in the
area of Chkholvon and that a significant
number of Japanese are found in the 7th and
8th divisions of the Rhee Syngmann troops.
The use by the United States of Japa-
nese servicemen in military operations in
Korea is a gross violation of the Potsdam
declaration, and also of section III of the
resolution of the Far Eastern Commission
“Basic Policy in Relation to Japan after
Capitulation” of June 19, 1947, and the
resolution adopted on the basis of this docu-
ment “Prohibition of Military Activity in
Japan and Use of Japanese Military Equip-
ment” of February 12, 1948. The Potsdam
declaration and aforementioned resolution
of the Far Eastern Commission provide for
the full disarmament and demilitarization of
Japan, forbid the reestablishment or posses-
sion of any kind of Japanese military forma-
tions.
The Soviet delegation supports the pro-
test of the government of the Korean People’s
Democratic Republic against the use by the
USA of Japanese servicemen in the war
against the Korean people. The Soviet del-
egation considers that the Far Eastern Com-
mission must not disregard the aforemen-
tioned facts, which testify to the direct viola-
tion of the agreed-upon decision on the de-
militarization of Japan.”
Give the statement to the press.
A. GROMYKO
[Source: APRF, Fond 3, Opis 65, Delo 827,
Listy 141-143 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis
5a, Delo 3, Papka 11, Listy 155-157]
32. 28 October 1950, ciphered telegram,
Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), via
Roshchin
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 26239
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin
From BeijingReceived 19 hours 50 minutes
28.10.1950
TOP PRIORITY T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
27 October I received the following tele-
gram from Mao Zedong addressed to you:
“Comrade Filippov!
In connection with the military situation
that has developed in China at the present
time, we urgently need to acquire from the
Soviet Union the following armaments for
the navy: high-speed torpedo boats, floating
mines, armored ships, small patrol boats,
minesweeping equipment, coastal fortress
artillery and torpedo bomber planes.
I therefore intend to send immediately to
Moscow by plane the commander of the navy
Xiao Jinguang together with adviser Com-
rade Kuz’min in order to conduct negotia-
tions with the responsible comrades of the
Soviet Navy on the question of the request for
the above mentioned arms and on the ques-
tion of the construction of the Chinese navy in
the future.
Along with Comrade Xiao Jinguang,
two other comrades from the navy adminis-
tration of China, Lue Shuchu and deputy
chief of the rear administration of the navy
Comrade Tsin I-tin, must also go [to Mos-
cow].
I ask you to review the aforementioned
and give me a corresponding reply.
MAO ZEDONG 27 October 1950.”
part in military operations in KOREA, have
only (six) battle sets of rifle-machine gun
cartridges. In the future, in connection with
the development of military operations, we
will have a very great need to supply the
army with ammunition. If there is no change
in military production, then the rearmament
can be begun in the second half of 1951.
For overcoming the difficulties of the
present time I ask you to review the question
of the possibility of the delivery of small
arms for 36 (thirty-six) divisions in the course
of January and February 1951, according to
the following list (name, quantity in pieces):
1. Soviet rifles 140,000.
2. Rifle cartridges 58,000,000.
3. Soviet sub-machine guns 26,000.
4. Cartridges for sub-machine guns
80,000,000.
5. Soviet light machine guns 7,000.
6. Cartridges for light machine guns
37,000,000.
7. Soviet heavy machine guns 2,000.
8. Cartridges for heavy machine guns
20,000,000.
9. Pilots’ handguns 1,000.
10. Cartridges for pilots’ handguns
100,000.
11. TNT 1,000 tons.
I ask you to communicate to me the
results of your review of my request.
I wish you health.
MAO ZEDONG
No. 2784
7.11.50
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 335,
Listy 80-81]
37. 9 November 1950, VKB(b) CC Polit-
buro decision with approved message from
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Dobre pomysły nie mają przeszłości, mają tylko przyszłość. Robert Mallet
De minimis - o najmniejszych rzeczach.
Dobroć jest ważniejsza niż mądrość, a uznanie tej prawdy to pierwszy krok do mądrości. Theodore Isaac Rubin
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